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VIRTUAL ESPIONAGE: SPYW ARE AND THE COMMON 
LAW PRIVACY TORTS 
Don Corbettt 
INTRODUCTION 
Like any working mother with children, time always seemed to 
be an obstacle for Danielle. I Her schedule seemed endlessly 
divided between preparing presentations at work, fixing breakfast, 
lunch, or dinner, and running between activities for the kids. She 
had never been computer savvy, but by helping her children 
complete some homework assignments, Danielle was introduced to 
the wonders of the Internet. She realized she could use her home 
computer to pay her bills, shop, read various newspapers, and keep 
up with her favorite television shows more quickly and easily than 
ever before. 
After several months of heavy Internet usage, Danielle noticed 
her computer was not operating as quickly as it had in the past. 
She also saw a large increase in the number of advertisements that 
appeared on her screen as she tried to either read material or pay 
her bills. On two occasions, when Danielle connected to the 
Internet, she found her home page had been changed. She thought 
these incidents were slightly peculiar, but paid them little attention 
since she did not know much about computers. The Internet still 
seemed like a godsend. 
One day, Danielle went online to pay another bill and was 
shocked to see her account showing a zero balance. Since she had 
just gotten paid the previous week, she knew this was inaccurate. 
Moreover, when she looked at a more detailed version of her 
transactions, she noticed a number of sizable purchases charged to 
her account that she did not recognize. Horrified, Danielle called 
the bank and was notified that not only were all the purchases 
made in the last week, but also several even larger purchases were 
standing by waiting to be cleared by the bank. Danielle informed 
the bank that she had no idea how the purchases happened because 
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I. While Danielle is a fictional character, the idea for her presence was influenced 
by Spyware Center Spyware Horror Stories: The Pitfalls of Pornography, 
http://www.download.coml1200-2023-5139045.html(last visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
1 
2 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 36 
no other person possessed her account information and she had 
never made them. When she told bank representatives about her 
online activity, they infonned her that due to possible infiltration 
of her computer, she might not be the only one with access to her 
account. 
Danielle called a computer repair company. After a thorough 
inspection, the company's employees informed Danielle she had 
several dozen software applications commonly known as 
"spyware" loaded on to her computer. The spyware enabled 
someone in cyberspace to watch every move Danielle made on her 
computer. The computer repair employees told her that one or 
more of these spyware programs had likely gathered her bank 
account information and shared it with a third party, paving the 
way for the unauthorized purchases. 
Like Danielle, thousands of other computer owners are unaware 
of the perils of spyware, a form of advertising-supported software. 
The term "spyware" is Internet slang that describes technology 
which "takes up residence" on a personal computer, usually 
without the owner's knowledge or consent. 2 Its purpose is to 
gather information about "the activities and preferences of the 
computer's users," and to retrieve data stored on a computer so it 
can be forwarded to a third party. 3 While some of these programs 
are fairly harmless, other more nefarious spyware programs can 
lead to problems ranging from those suffered by Danielle all the 
way to the theft of one's identity. 
If Danielle is lucky, she will recover the majority of her money 
lost based on unauthorized purchases.4 Still, the monitoring of 
one's computer use can result in not just financial harm. It can 
also produce a significant breach of another important, but less 
tangible interest-the person's right to privacy. 5 One of the 
fundamental principles related to our general understanding of 
what constitutes privacy is a person's ability to retreat to a space 
where he or she cannot be troubled, interrupted, or viewed by the 
2. ED TITTEL, PC MAGAZINE FIGHTING SPYWARE, VIRUSES, AND MALWARE 6 (2005). 
3. Id. at 6-7. 
4. The Federal Fair Credit Billing Act allows parties to contest charges for 
purchases that account holders did not receive or accept. See 15 U.S.c. § 1666 
(2000). The Act requires that the creditor either clarify the charge or "make 
appropriate corrections in the account of the obligor," id. at § 1666(a)(B), but the 
creditor who fails to do so only forfeits a maximum of $50.00. Id. at § 1666( e). 
Also, the Act is limited to "billing errors." See id. at § 1666. This does include a 
variety of activities, such as mathematical problems or a failure to properly credit 
an account for returned merchandise. Id. at § 1666(b)(4)-(5). For a good 
summary of the Federal Fair Credit Billing Act, see Credit Cards: What's Wrong 
With This Bill?, CONSUMERREpORTS, Feb. 2004, 
http://www.consumerreports.orglcro/personal-finance/creditcard-billing-errors-
204/0verview/index.htm. 
5. See infra Part II. 
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outside world. 6 However, as our dependence on computer 
technology and our Internet usage become more extensive, it is 
also clear that our sense of personal privacy is potentially under 
attack in novel ways. 
This Article will discuss whether the common law torts that 
protect one's privacy rights-intrusion upon one's seclusion, 
public disclosure of private facts, appropriation of one's likeness, 
and placing a party in an objectionable false light in the public 
eye-can properly and effectively combat the new privacy threats 
potentially caused by advertising-supported software. 7 Part I 
chronicles the rise of spyware as a problem, focusing particular 
attention on how it works and how it potentially endangers people 
like Danielle. Part II will discuss the evolution of the torts that 
comprise the rights of action protecting a plaintiff's privacy 
interests. Part III will analyze the applicability of these torts to the 
possible privacy hazards associated with advertising-supported 
software. The Article concludes with the premise that under some 
circumstances, courts can and should recognize spyware-related 
incidents as actionable invasions of privacy for plaintiffs. 
PART I 
American dependence on technology extends to our daily lives 
in ways that could not have been imagined thirty years ago. 8 For 
many of us, as we head to work, we cannot do so without our 
Blackberries or tablet computers. 9 When we leave work for home, 
we make a direct path to the Xbox, iPod, or TiVo. IO We can no 
longer envision our lives without cell phones or home computers. II 
Our technological addictions have created a new type of arms race 
that now allows people to store, transmit, and access more 
information in more ways than at any other time in human history. 
But for every electronic advance, there is collateral risk. Our 
dependence is not lost on those who wish to profit from our 
reliance. Third-parties, like advertisers, marketing professionals, 
and hackers, have also benefited from the recent technology 
boom. 12 The more we use personal computers, the more "they" 
6. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 262 (2d ed. 
2002). 
7. See infra Parts II(A), II(C) & III. 
8. See Associated Press, Poll Finds Americans Dependent on Tech Gadgets, USA 
TODAY, Dec. 21, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.comltechlnews/2005-
12-21-techpoll_x.htm?POE=click-refer. . 
9. Id. 
10. See id. 
II. Id. 
12. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
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can see US. 13 By using the science available to track Internet 
activity, often via spyware or adware, these third-parties can 
personalize their marketing in a way that other traditional 
advertising media cannot. 14 While much of the marketing use of 
spyware can be relatively harmless,15 computer hackers can also 
use this technology for malevolent purposes. 16 Each time a 
computer user clicks on an unsolicited Web site or advertisement, 
he or she potentially creates an avenue for spyware to infect one's 
system. 17 
A. Advertising and the Internet 
While not all can afford the latest scientific wizardry, most 
people can place much of the world at their fingertips via the 
Internet, a global, interconnected network of com~uters that 
provides a pathway to information of any and all types. 8 From its 
humble origins as a small collection of computer networks used by 
the Department of Defense for military communications,19 the 
Internet now allows users to easily find and use data regarding 
virtually any subject from any part of the world. 2o The term 
"Internet" is often inaccurately used interchangeably with the term 
"World Wide Web.,,21 The Internet refers to the technology that 
enables information to be retrieved online through computers, 
servers, and cables, while the Web is the compilation of text, 
audio, and photographs that can be accessed via the Internet. 22 
Semantics aside, people like Danielle now use the Internet and the 
World Wide Web to shop, do all of their banking, and keep up 
with current events. The Pew Internet and American Life Project 
estimated that on an average day in 2005, 94 million Americans 
13. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
14. See PCmag.com, Definition of: Spyware, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_termlO.2542.+=spyware&i=51898,00.asp 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
15. See What is Spyware?, http://www.spywaredetectiontips.com (last visited Dec. 
30,2006). 
16. Top Ways a Hacker Can Get Into Your Computer, 
http://www.winferno.com/guides/articles/block-spam-block-popups-block-
hackers.asp (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
17. See Spyware, http://onguardonline.gov/spyware.html(last visited Dec. 30,2006). 
18. The Internet has been defined in many ways. This is only one example. See In re 
Doubleclick, Inc., Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497,501 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
19. Id. 
20. HARLEY HAHN & RICK STOUT, THE INTERNET COMPLETE REFERENCE 497 (1994). 
21. In re Daub/eclick, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 501. 
22. See id. 
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used the Internet. 23 It is also estimated that in 2006, approximately 
1.043 billion people across the planet will access the Internet. 24 
As it became evident that increasing numbers of people were 
spending larger amounts of time on the Web, advertisers began to 
direct more resources toward Internet marketing. 25 This online 
advertising comes in several models. 26 "Banner" advertisements 
are bars that resemble billboards that either run across the top of 
the Web page or down one of its sides. 27 Then, there are 'Fop-up" 
advertisements, which are separate advertising windows. 2 When 
users click on the advertisement, they are then connected to the 
advertiser's Web page. 29 While banner advertisements do not 
necessarily interfere with the user's ability to read the substantive 
content of the Web site, pop-up ads jump to the top of the screen 
and require the user to close them in order to continue working on 
whatever is beneath the ad. 3o Many advertisements also now use 
real-time videos on the Web to display their wares, giving them 
more of a look and feel of traditional television commercials. 31 
When Web browsers began to develop programs that allowed 
users to block pop-up ads, software developers created "pop-
under" ads, which ap~ear behind the page the user views as 
opposed to on top of it. 2 Yet another form is the "floater," which 
uses a Macromedia Flash program to display the ad in front of the 
user's screen for as long as 30 seconds before the desired Web 
page is finally accessible. 33 Floater ads do not create a separate 
window like pop-up ads, so although they do have "close" options 
on them, they still obscure the entire page beneath them. 34 
23. Daily Internet Activities, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/trends/Daily _Activities_12.05 .05.htrn (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2006). 
24. World Internet Usage and Population Statistics (June 30, 2006), 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. 
25. Interactive Advertising Bureau, Internet Advertising Revenues Close to $4 
Billion for Ql 2006 (May 30, 2006), 
http://www.iab.net/news/pr_2006_05_30.asp. 
26. See TITTEL, supra note 2, at 12-15. 
27. ld. at 12. 
28. /d. 
29. What is Spyware?, supra note 15. 
30. TITTEL, supra note 2, at 12. Pop-up ads tend to be favored by marketers because 
it is more likely that web visitors will click on them as opposed to banner 
advertisements. See Ronald R. Urbach & Gary A. Kibei, AdwarelSpyware: An 
Update Regarding Pending Litigation and Legislation, 16 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. 
LJ.7, 12 (2004), available at http://www.dglaw.com/images/ITjournal.pdf. 
31. See Hyun Ju Jeong, Development of InternetlWWW Ad, 
http://www.ciadvertising.org/SAIfall_02/adv391k/jeong/page4_2.html(last 
visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
32. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Pop-Up Ads Shed Blocks. Tackle Consumers, WASH. 
POST, June 26, 2005, at F5. 
33. /d. 
34. /d. 
6 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 36 
While traditional advertising used polling and research to best 
predict what viewers might read or see, online advertisers are now 
able to accomplish the same goal by using technology to track the 
habits of users. For example, when users visit certain Web pages, 
the site may place textual records called "cookies" on the hard 
drive. 35 These very small text files record information like user 
names, passwords, or account numbers, so the user does not have 
to enter the same information every time they access that particular 
site.36 Cookies are also capable of tracking the user's movements 
on the Web, allowing those who receive the information to 
calculate what type of advertising that particular user may find 
attractive so they can send users targeted advertisements in the 
future. 37 Cookies are fairly harmless because they often are easy 
to block by privacy controls that exist on most Web browsers. 38 
They are also easily removed by any number of "anti-spyware 
programs. ,,39 
B. Defining and Understanding Spyware 
Spyware tends to be difficult to precisely characterize because it 
can encompass anything that resides on your computer that has the 
ability to report on the preferences and activities of the user once it 
is installed. 40 Spyware is regularly grouped with another term 
called "adware," but although the two terms share certain traits, 
they are not identica1.41 Adware is designed to display advertising 
on your computer while it is running,42 and is generally attached to 
larger software applications like music file-sharing programs, 
which typically come at no financial cost to the user. 43 Many of 
these free software applications contain end-user licensing 
agreements. These agreements, in very cumbersome language, 
inform the user that certain other programs may be attached to the 
free application the user is downloading.44 Upon downloading the 
program, users may unknowingly attach adware to their systems, 
which collects the data of the Web sites the users visit, and enables 
advertisers to target future ads toward particular users.45 
35. 67 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 249 § 1 (2002) [hereinafter Proof of Facts]. 
36. /d. 
37. Id. 
38. TITTEL, supra note 2, at 8. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 7. 
41. Compare id. at 7 with id. at 10. Contra Urbach & KibeI, supra note 30, at 12. 
42. TIITEL, supra note 2, at 10. 
43. Robert Vamosi, How to Protect Yourself from Snooping Spyware (Feb. 17, 
2003). http://reviews-zdnet.com.coml4520-7297_l6-4207864.htm1. 
44. This is a common tactic in peer-to-peer file sharing programs, such as popular 
music download sites like KaZaa. See Urbach & KibeI, supra note 30, at 12. 
45. /d. 
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Similarly, users often inadvertently download spyware 
applications by simply clicking on pop-up advertisements,46 
visiting certain Web sites, or opening unsolicited electronic-mail 
messages. 47 But, the installation comes without the user's consent 
because the spyware programs do not provide the same notice that 
the end-user licensing agreement does. 48 While some precautions 
can be taken to guard against spyware infecting one's computer, 
inexperienced parties like Danielle often do not protect themselves 
against these software programs because they are unaware of their 
existence until it is too late. Moreover, spyware has proven to be 
flexible, versatile, and resourceful. Once it is on your computer, it 
is notoriously difficult to uninstall or delete.49 
The danger of spyware fluctuates according to the type of 
tracking device in the software. Some forms are merely designed 
to watch your Web activity and track the sites you visit,50 much 
like cookies. There is also the Browser Highjacking Object 
(BHO), which is designed to take over the user's Internet 
browser. 51 The BHO can reset the user's home page to the 
vendor's Web page or even alter the results one sees when 
conducting searches52 through more traditional engines like 
Google. 53 
One of the most hazardous forms of spyware is the "keystroke 
logger." It can come in the form of a battery-sized plug that is 
physically inserted into the computer, or it can be downloaded on 
to your system as software. 54 It has the ability to record keystrokes 
that it saves as text on its own hard drive, allowing the party who 
installed it to collect the information by physically removing it or 
reading the data when it is uploaded periodically over the 
Internet. 55 The key logger tool provides some beneficial uses, 
such as allowing parents to monitor the Internet activity of their 
children, but it can also be used to access sensitive personal 
46. Generally, the underlying Web site has no relationship with either the pop-up 
provider or the advertiser. See id. 
47. Brad Slutsky & Shelia Baran, Just a Tad Intrusive? Spyware and the Internet, 
Bus. L. TODAY, Dec. 14,2004, at 33. 
48. Id. at 34. 
49. [d. at 33. 
50. Proof of Facts, supra note 35, at 249 § I. 
51. Slutsky & Baran, supra note 47, at 33. 
52. Id. 
53. Google is an Internet search engine owned by Google, Inc., which allows users to 
search for Web pages, videos, or other images. See generally Goog\e, 
http://www.google.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). Google is the largest search 
engine on the Internet, and receives an estimated 200 million queries per day. 
See Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Is Google God?, NY TIMES (June 29, 2003), 
available at http://www.cnn.coml2003/US/06/29/nyt.friedmanl. 
54. See What is a Keylogger? (June 8, 2005), 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.comlsDefinitionlO,,sid 14~ci962518,00.html. 
55. Id. 
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information, such as Social Security numbers, e-mail passwords, 
bank account transactions, or credit card numbers. 56 Criminal use 
of programs like the keystroke logger has led to a sharp rise in 
consumer complaints of Internet-related fraud and identity theft. 57 
In 2004, the federal government estimated total losses related to 
identity theft and credit card fraud at $52.6 billion to individuals 
and businesses. 58 
The arrangement between those who provide spyware or 
adware and Web site operators is mutually advantageous. Web 
site operators receive much-needed revenue by selling advertising 
to those who are interested, which offsets the costs associated with 
product development. 59 Conversely, while advertisers may not 
know for certain if their· television commercials or print 
advertisements are being seen by their target audience, pop-up ads, 
pop-under ads, and floaters ensure that their ad displays are at least 
being seen by their· audiences, even if not every user clicks on the 
advertisement. 60 While marketers may have been initially slow to 
realize the potential of the Internet, this is no longer the case. 61 In 
the third quarter of 2005, Internet advertising revenues reached a 
56. Slutsky & Baran, supra note 47, at 33. For example, Specter Pro, which 
describes itself as "the world's best selling software for monitoring and recording 
every detail of PC and Internet activity," enables those who purchase it to use its 
key logger to document every key typed on the keyboards of their personal 
computers. SpectorSoft, 
http://www.spectorsoft.comlproducts/SpectorPro_ Windows/entry .asp?refer=6940 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2006). It is designed to intercept alphanumeric keystrokes 
and hidden characters, like the shift and control key. Id. It allows users to also 
record instant messages, all electronic mail (both sent and received), Web sites 
visited, and keystrokes entered, and it offers keyword detection and Internet 
access blocking. Id. It retails anywhere from $99.95 to $149.95. Id. 
57. See FIN. CRIMES SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO 
THE PUBLIC § El (2005), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financiallfcs_report052005/fcs_report052005. 
pdf. 
58. Id. 
59. See TiTTEL, supra note 2, at 4. 
60. See Urbach & Kibei, supra note 30, at 12. 
61. This trend can be seen in the growth of the Claria Corporation, a California-based 
company that specializes in online marketing. Claria Corporation, 
http://www.hoovers.comlclarial--ID _1 06214--/free-co-factsheet.xhtml (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2006). Founded in 1998, Claria, formerly known as the Gator 
Corporation, used to serve targeted advertisements to forty million computer 
users through its network. Id. Claria-Cornpany Information-Corporate 
Overview, http://www.claria.comlcornpanyinfo/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
Claria used to broadcast its advertisement messages through software 
applications that tracked the users' online behavior, often doing so as a part of 
free software packages. Claria Corporation, http://www.hoovers.comlclaria/--
ID_I06214--/free-co-factsheet.xhtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). In 2003, it 
generated $90.5 million in sales, a one-year increase of 122.9% over the previous 
year. Claria Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Apr. 8, 2004), available 
at http://knobias.IOkwizard.comlfiling.php?repo=tenk&doc= l&ipage=2723312. 
Claria's net income for 2003 was $34.9 million, a one-year growth rate of 
38,203%. Id. 
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record $3.1 billion, the highest quarter reported and a 33.9 percent 
increase over the previous year. 62 The estimated annual Internet 
advertising revenue projection for 2005 was $12 billion, a nearly 
$3 billion increase over 2004.63 It is precisely this desire to move 
product that is, at a minimum, causally connected to some of the 
injuries caused by spyware. 
The prevalence of spyware and adware is far from isolated. In 
October 2004, America Online and the National Cyber Security 
Alliance conducted a study involving 329 randomly selected 
personal computers. 64 The study found that 80 percent of the 
computers contained some form of spyware.65 The average 
"infected" computer had 93 spyware or adware programs, 
providing a small snapshot of the risk to the average user.66 In 
response, several anti-spyware bills have been introduced in both 
the United States House of Representatives and the Senate,67 but 
none have yet gained the traction necessary for passage in both 
bodies. 68 The Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass 
Act (Spy ACT), sponsored by Representative Mary Bono (R-
Calif.), was backed by the Energy and Commerce Committee in 
March 2005. 69 The SPY ACT precludes any person who is not an 
authorized user or owner of a protected computer from engaging in 
any deceptive act categorized as taking control of the computer,70 
modifying settings related to use of the computer or to the 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
Press Release, The Interactive Advertising 
Revenues Surpass $3 Billion for 
http://www.iab.net/news/pr_2005_11_21.asp. 
Id. 
Bureau, Internet Advertising 
Q3 (Nov. 21, 2005), 
Press Release, National Cyber Security Alliance, Largest In-Home Study of 
Home Computer Users Shows Major Online Threats, Perception Gap (Oct. 25, 
2004), available at http://www.staysafeonline.info/pdfINCSA-AOLIn-
HomeStudyRelease.pdf. 
[d. at 2. 
One computer in the study contained 1,059 spyware or adware programs. Id. at 
2. 
There are already a number of federal laws aimed at protecting privacy rights of 
individuals. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, for example, 
precludes the interception or disclosure of the contents of any electronic 
communication, ranging from electronic mail to telephone conversations, but it is 
riddled with exceptions and does not appear applicable to spyware. See 18 
U.S.c. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). 
These include Software Principles Yielding Better Levels of Consumer 
Knowledge (SPY BLOCK) Act, S. 687, 109th Congo (2005), Securely Protect 
Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act (SPY ACT), H.R. 29, 109th Congo (2005), 
and Internet Spyware Prevention (I-SPY) Act of 2004, H.R. 4661, 108th Congo 
(2004). Utah and California are the only states to date that have enacted anti-
spyware legislation. See CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947-22947.6 (West 
Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-101 to-401 (2005). 
David McGuire, Congress Moving to Tackle Spyware Problem, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 15, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dynlA55744-2005Aprl5. 
See H.R. 29, § 2(a)(1). 
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computer's ability to access or use the Internet,71 or collecting 
personally identifiable information through the use of a keystroke 
logger. 72 The Spy Aci prohibits several other activities as well, 
but part of the problem with any state or federal legislation is that 
it runs the risk of being overinclusive. Because spyware has been 
difficult to label, any number of legitimate advertising Web 
features could be rendered inoperable by statutory language that is 
too broad or sweeping. 73 While the SPY ACT does allow for hefty 
fines for any company that engages in a pattern and practice of 
spyware-related activity,74 such legislation would no doubt be 
vigorously contested by those with lawful marketing and 
advertising interests. 
In summary, it is clear that now more than ever, unassuming 
consumers are at greater risk for divulging private information. 
The proliferation of spyware and adware is evidence that the 
information available online is worth large amounts of money to 
those who obtain it, whether they are selling information to another 
party, using that information for marketing purposes, or getting it 
to pilfer funds or make purchases from the personal accounts of 
others. 75 This points to only one conclusion: If you use your PC 
to go online, there is an excellent chance someone is monitoring 
you without your consent. 
PART II 
Of all the things most Americans do on a daily basis, few joys 
rival that of returning to our homes at the end of the day. Being 
able to shut the door on the rest of the world and retreat to our own 
space is often the chief incentive for working our way through the 
rigors of work, school, or in some cases, socializing. But what is it 
about our privacy that we cherish so much? Clearly, the 
independence involved with being able to choose your own path of 
movement presents one rationale. 76 The freedom to select when 
you want to engage in discussion and when you wish to retreat 
from such provides us with needed self-autonomy and 
empowerment in ways that the bulk of our daily activities do not 
71. See id. § 2(a)(2). 
72. See id. § 2(a)(3). 
73. See McGuire, supra note 69. 
74. See H.R. 29, § 4(b)(I)(A) (stating that the proposed fine to be paid to the Federal 
Trade Commission for repeated violations of deceptive acts or practices relating 
to spyware is $3 million). 
75. See TITTEL, supra note 2, at 4. 
76. See Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away from Work, 66 LA. L. REv. 945, 952-54 
(2006); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1335, 
1374 (1992); June Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New 
Tort?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REv. 965, 987-90 (2001). 
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allow.77 Much of the disparate range of human natural emotion, be 
it pleasure, sadness, grief, or anger, would be stifled considerably 
if people could not express such feelings behind closed doors, 
leading one to conclude that our right to be left alone is essential to 
our personal and emotional development. 78 
Although the law was slightly delinquent in recognizing the 
high societal value in maintaining one's right to be left alone, the 
limits and threshold of our right to privacy-tortious, 
constitutional, or otherwise-have engendered considerable 
debate. 79 As we head further into an information age that is sure to 
see the reach of technology's tentacles extend to more areas oflife, 
it will get increasingly difficult to retreat without someone having 
access to one's person. Spyware is only one small element in this 
equation, but in many ways, it is a microcosm of the larger tension 
between the present-day societal interest in data collection and the 
individual's right to withdraw from the world when he or she 
chooses to do so. 
A. Privacy: A Brief Background 
Before pinpointing some of the particulars of the tort of 
invasion of privacy, the wide spectrum and scope of what 
constitutes privacy in the United States80 merits a brief background 
discussion. Though a uniform definition of privacy is somewhat 
elusive,81 both the federal and state branches of the American 
judicial and legislative wings of government have consistently 
attempted to protect the right of individuals and groups82 to have 
77. Finkin, supra note 76, at 952-54; Gonnley, supra note 76, at 1374; Makdisi, 
supra note 76, at 987-90. 
78. Finkin, supra note 76, at 952-54; Gonnley, supra note 76, at 1374; Makdisi, 
supra note 76, at 987-90. 
79. Gonnley, supra note 76, at 1339-40. 
80. Although much of tort law in the United States has its roots in old English 
jurisprudence, the right to privacy is largely an American concept. Great Britain 
itself never fonnally recognized a right to privacy until it enacted the Human 
Rights Act of 1998. Kathryn F. Deringer, Comment, Privacy and the Press: The 
Convergence of British and French Law in Accordance with the European 
Convention of Human Rights, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 191, 198 (2003). It later 
adopted the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Id. Prior to that time, however, Parliament rebuffed 
attempts to enact legislation related to privacy rights. Id. This changed shortly 
after the death of Princess Diana. Id.; see also Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 
62, 70 (C.A.) (U.K.) (stating that only Parliament can recognize right of privacy). 
81. Webster's Dictionary defines privacy as: "\. the state of being private; retirement 
or seclusion. 2. freedom from the intrusion of others in one's private life or 
affairs: the right to privacy. 3. secrecy." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY 979 (2d ed. 2001). 
82. While the vast majority of privacy cases involve individuals, the U.S. 
Constitution guarantees both freedom of religion and freedom of association, 
which are more likely to affect groups of people. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The 
word "privacy," however, makes no appearance in the Constitution. 
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their own autonomy, freely express themselves, and retreat from 
society, if and when necessary.83 Additionally, an individual's 
right to privacy is, to some degree, protected by cultural, social, 
and ethical norms as well. 84 
To the extent that it can be categorized, Professor Anita Allen-
Castellitto and other scholars have succinctly divided United States 
privacy law into four distinct classifications: informational 
privacy, physical privacy, proprietary privacy, and decisional 
privacy. 85 Informational privacy protects a person's right to 
preclude others from either gaining access to, or publishing 
information that that person would consider private or 
confidential. 86 Plaintiffs have successfully argued that disclosure 
of medical records87 and other confidential matters88 violated their 
right to keep personal information from being disclosed to the 
public. Physical privacy rights safeguard a person's interest in his 
or her own bodily autonomy and emotional tranquility.89 Physical 
privacy cases cast a wide net across areas ranging from 
constitutional issues, such as a party's Fourth Amendment 
protection from illegal searches and seizures by the government90 
to improper "viewing intrusions.,,91 The home is often the 
benchmark of a person's physical privacy rights. 92 Proprietary 
privacy rights shield our interest in keeping others from exploiting 
our likeness93 for monetary gain or other business purposes.94 
83. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
84. See Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, The Origins and Growth of u.s. Privacy Law, in 
FIRST ANNUAL INST. ON PRIVACY LAW, STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN A 
HIGH TECH AND CHANGING REGULATORY ENV'T, at 11, 13 (PU Intellectual Prop., 
Course Handbook Series No. G-607, 2000). 
85. [d. 
86. See id. at 19 tbl. 1. 
87. See, e.g., Pachowitz v. Ledoux, 2003 WI App. 120, ~ 24, 265 Wis. 2d 631, ~ 24, 
666 N.W.2d 88, ~ 24 (finding that disclosure of plaintiff's private medical 
records by emergency medical technician to one person constituted invasion of 
privacy under state law). 
88. See, e.g., Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (1991) (finding that 
defendant's disclosure of plaintiff's human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status 
violated plaintiff's privacy rights when plaintiff only revealed information to 
protect other health care workers who may come into contact with him). 
89. See Allen-Castellitto, supra note 84, at 19 tbl. l. 
90. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that citizens 
have reasonable and legitimate expectations of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment, even in areas as small as a public phone booth). 
9l. See, e.g., Speer v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 68 Ohio Misc. 2d 13, 15, 646 
N.E.2d 273, 274 (Ohio Ct. CI. 1994) (holding that the defendant violated the 
plaintiff'S privacy rights by using electronic surveillance devices in the bathroom 
where she worked); see also John A. Robertson, Privacy Issues in Second Stage 
Genomics, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 59, 62 (1999). 
92. See Allen-Castellitto, supra note 84, at 19 tbl. I. 
93. See, e.g., Minnifield v. Ashcraft, 903 So. 2d 818, 827 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) 
(holding that defendant's publication of photographs of plaintiff's tattoos 
constituted a potential invasion of plaintiff's privacy). 
94. See Allen-Castellitto, supra note 84, at 19 tbl. l. 
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Decisional privacy protects one's right to make ~ersonal choices 
free from government interference or restriction. 5 This type of 
privacy has proven to be a lightning rod for controversy due to the 
complex social overtones associated with protections concerning 
abortion,96 contraception,97 homosexual ity, 98 and one's 
"constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and 
nutrition.,,99 Privacy rights are not absolute and frequently must be 
weighed against other interests that may be at stake during 
litigation. Still, because of their essential underlying principles of 
self-autonomy, acceptance, and independence, privacy rights are 
exceedingly important to most Americans. 100 
The development and evolution of the four branches that 
currently comprise the tort of invasion of ~rivacy probably can be 
traced to a pair of law review articles: 1 1 Louis Brandeis and 
Samuel Warren's article, The Right to Privacy, which was 
published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890,102 and Dean 
William Prosser's article Privacy, which was published seventy 
years later in the University of California Law Review. 103 Since 
then, the origins and development of the right to privacy have been 
among the most discussed topics in American jurisprudence. 104 
B. Warren and Brandeis: The Inspiration 
Legend has it that around 1890, Samuel Warren, who graduated 
at the top of his class at Harvard Law School but had ceased 
practicing law, became exasperated at the Boston press for its 
95. See id. 
96. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment supersedes laws that criminalize 
abortion). 
97. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that fundamental 
rights to marital privacy exist with the "penumbra" of liberties within the 
Constitution's Bill of Rights and thereby prohibit any legislation that attempts to 
criminalize contraception). 
98. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute 
prohibiting intimate acts between members of the same sex is unconstitutional 
due to infringement upon liberty interests provided by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
99. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (recognizing 
Fourteenth Amendment protection of a competent person's right to refuse further 
medical treatment). 
100. See Allen-Castellitto, supra note 84, at 13. 
IOI. VICTOR SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 939-40 (I I th ed. 2005). 
102. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
103. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
104. See, e.g., Joshua Herman, Identifying Privacy: An Introduction, 54 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 657 (2005) (discussing symposium on modem applications of privacy law to 
several areas based on historical development). 
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tendency to regularly report on his wife's social activities. lOS 
According to Prosser, events "came to a head when the newspapers 
had a field day on the occasion of the wedding of a daughter, and 
Mr. Warren became annoyed." I 06 Warren contacted Louis 
Brandeis, his former law partner, and the two crafted a law review 
article that became the foundation for privacy rights in the United 
States. 107 While the urban legend of what exactly precipitated the 
article has since been debunked somewhat,108 it is clear that the 
authors were motivated at least in part by concern about journalism 
tactics 109 that became more pronounced with the advent of the 
technological changes that threatened individual solitude. IIO They 
wrote: 
Recent inventions and business methods call 
attention to the next step which must be taken for 
the protection of the person, and for securing to the 
individual what Judge [Thomas] Cooley calls the 
right "to be let alone." Instantaneous photographs 
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life; and 
numerous mechanical devices threaten to make 
good the prediction that "what is whispered in the 
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops." III 
Prior to the article, American courts had not affirmatively 
recognized an individual right to privacy that was enforceable via 
civil court,112 but had on occasion crafted legal remedies using 
105. See Prosser, supra note 103, at 383. 
106. Id. (citing ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946)). 
107. Prosser, supra note 103, at 383-84. 
108. See, e.g., James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. 
L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 
875,891-907 (1979); Gormley, supra note 76, at 1349-50. 
109. Warren and Brandeis wrote: 
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of 
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle 
and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with 
industry as well as effrontery. To satisfY a prurient taste the details of 
sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily 
papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with 
idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the 
domestic circle. 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 196. 
110. For an excellent synopsis of the historical context that provided the backdrop for 
the article of Warren and Brandeis, see Gormley, supra note 76, at 1350-53. 
III. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 195 (footnote omitted). The 
technological advances at issue in this excerpt from the article are not far 
removed from the same types of issues facing society today. 
112. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees individuals the "right 
... to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects," but these rights only 
curtailed the government's ability to intrude on one's home or property; private 
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eXIstmg law to safeguard such a right. 113 For example, an 
aggrieved party could file a trespass action to protect his or her 
privacy rights, but the plaintiff had to prove that a physical 
invasion took place in order to be successful. I14 It was also 
possible for parties to be prosecuted criminally for invading the 
privacy of another, but such laws were often substantively 
ineffective. I IS Although courts had not yet gone far enough to 
positively ensure that one did indeed have the right to be left alone, 
Warren and Brandeis were able to successfully mold such an 
argument around a fundamental premise: creating a right to 
privacy was far from legal overkill because so many other areas of 
law already implicitly supported such a right. 116 
The authors explained that one court had already held that the 
author of any private letter, literary product, or other artistic work 
"possesses such a right of property in them, that they cannot be 
published without his consent, unless the purposes of justice, civil 
or criminal, require the publication." 117 Another court had 
precluded student publication of a teaching surgeon's lectures on 
the grounds that making the material public would be a breach of 
confidence that was tantamount to breach of an implied 
contract. 118 Warren and Brandeis argued that while such matters 
clearly deserved legal protection, to do so by stretching the areas of 
contract law or trusts was not legally sound. I 19 By recognizing the 
parties were not affected. u.s. CONST. amend. IV; accord United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14(1984). 
113. See supra notes 111-1 12 and accompanying text. 
114. See Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and 
Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 703, 705-06 (1990) (citing rYeS v. Humphrey, I 
E.D. Smith 196,201-02 (N.Y. Ct. c.P. 1851». 
115. See id. at 706. 
116. Warren and Brandeis opined that "[t]he common law secures to each individual 
the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to others." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, 
at 198. 
117. !d. at 204 n.l (quoting Sir Samuel Romilly (arg.), in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 
402,418 (1818) (U.K.)). 
118. See id. at 207-08 (citing Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209 (1825) (U.K.». 
119. Warren and Brandeis cited the nineteenth century case of Pollard v. 
Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345, 349-52 (1888) (U.K.), as an example of this 
problem. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 209. A photographer who had 
taken a picture of a woman was prevented from selling it or making copies of it, 
on the grounds that it was a breach of an implied term in the contract and that it 
was a breach of confidence. See Pollard, 40 Ch. D. at 352-53. The court found 
there had been a breach of contract, but said it was actually grounded in the area 
of property, so as not to disturb existing precedent. See id. Warren and Brandeis 
argued this was unsatisfactory: 
So long as these circumstances happen to present a contract upon 
which such a term can be engrafted by the judicial mind, or to supply 
relations upon which a trust or confidence can be erected, there may 
be no objection to working out the desired protection through the 
doctrines of contract or of trust. But the court can hardly stop there. 
The narrower doctrine may have satisfied the demands of society at a 
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more general right of privacy, it would no longer be necessary to 
contort existing areas of the law to create just results for wronged 
parties. 120 Moreover, since the law permitted compensation for 
mental distress, Warren and Brandeis contended that the private 
person who chose to keep personal concerns removed from the 
public eye also deserved compensation for whatever emotional 
harm may emanate from having such matters exposed without his 
authorization. 121 Accordingly, the pair deemed it sensible to 
broaden the law in order to meet the "political, social, and 
economic changes,,122 that were inevitable in a growing society. 123 
Warren and Brandeis also clearly understood, however, that 
such a right needed limitations, and suggested several possible 
areas of privilege: (1) The right to privacy should not prohibit any 
publication of any matter which is of public or general interest; 124 
(2) the right to privacy should not prohibit the communication of 
any matter, even if private in nature, when the publication is made 
under circumstances that would make it privileged under the law of 
defamation; 125 (3) any right to privacy would not likely grant 
redress for invasion of privacy by oral publication if there was no 
special damage;126 and (4) the right to privacy would cease upon 
the publication of the facts by the individual himself, or with his 
consent. 127 The authors also noted that neither the truth of the 
matter nor the absence of any malice on the part of the publisher 
would afford a defense to a privacy action. 128 
Despite the cogency and lucidity of the article's arguments, the 
right to privacy "revolution" was somewhat slow to materialize in 
the courtS.129 It was not until fifteen years after the article's 
time when the abuse to be guarded against could rarely have arisen 
without violating a contract or a special confidence; but now that 
modem devices afford abundant opportunities for the perpetration of 
such wrongs without any participation by the injured party, the 
protection granted by the law must be placed upon a broader 
foundation. 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 209-1 I. 
120. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 213-14. 
121. See id. 
122. Id. at 193. 
123. See generally id. 
124. Id. at 214. 
125. Id. at216. 
126. See id. at 217. 
127. Id. at218. 
128. Id. 
129. For example, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 
1902), the New York Court of Appeals rebuffed the claim of a plaintiff who had 
alleged that the defendants invaded her privacy by using her picture without her 
consent in an advertisement for flour. The court justified its decision based on 
concerns that: 
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publication that the first American court recognized a common law 
right to privacy.130 In Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. CO.,131 
Paolo Pavesich, an artist, sued New England Mutual, a life 
insurance company; Thomas Lumpkin, a general agent of New 
England Mutual; and photographer J.Q. Adams after a picture of 
Pavesich appeared in The Atlanta (Ga.) Constitution. 132 The 
plaintiff s photo appeared next to a person the court described as 
"ill-dressed and sickly looking."m The words, "Do it now. The 
man who did." appeared above the plaintiffs photograph, while 
the words, "Do it while you can. The man who didn't." appeared 
above the other picture. 134 The advertisement also included text 
implying that Pavesich had bought life insurance from New 
England Mutual, and that his life had prospered from that 
decision. 135 New England Mutual received the picture from a 
negative from Adams, but while Adams knew why the photograph 
would be used, Pavesich, who never had a life insurance policy 
with New England Mutual, did not consent to the use of his 
likeness. 136 He sued the defendants for libel and for invading his 
right to privacy. 137 
After the lower court sustained the demurrer of the 
defendants,138 Pavesich found a receptive audience for his claims 
in the Georgia Supreme Court. While acknowledging there had 
been no specific right to privacy in any prior decision, the court 
found that such a right did indeed exist: 
The right of privacy has its foundation in the 
instincts of nature. It is recognized intuitively, 
The attempts to logically apply the principle will necessarily 
result, not only in a vast amount of litigation, but in litigation 
bordering upon the absurd, for the right to privacy, once established 
as a legal doctrine, cannot be confined to the restraint of the 
publication of a likeness but must necessarily embrace as well the 
publication of a word-picture, a comment upon one's looks, conduct, 
domestic relations or habits. 
[d. at 443. In response, the New York legislature enacted a statute that made it a 
criminal misdemeanor and a possible tort action for any person, firm, or 
corporation to use another's name, portrait, or picture for commercial purposes 
without the consent of the subject. See 1903 N.Y. Laws 308 (codified as 
amended at N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2006». 
130. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
131. [d. 
132. [d. at 68. 
133. [d. 
134. /d. 
135. Under Pavesich's picture, the text of the advertisement said: "In my healthy and 
productive period of life I bought insurance in the New England Mutual Life 
Insurance Co., of Boston Mass., and to-day my family is protected and I am 
drawing an annual dividend on my paid-Up policies." [d. at 69. 
136. [d. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. 
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consciousness being the witness that can be called 
to establish its existence. Any person whose 
intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once 
that as to each individual member of society there 
are matters private, and there are matters public so 
far as the individual is concerned. Each individual 
as instinctively resents any encroachment by the 
public upon his rights which are of a private nature 
as he does the withdrawal of those of his rights 
which are of a public nature. A right to privacy in 
matters purely private is therefore derived from 
natural law. 139 
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The Pavesich decision recognizing the plaintiff's right to privacy 
produced more debate from American courts as to the legitimacy 
of such a right. 140 After the American Law Institute recognized 
such a right in the 1939 edition of the Restatement of Torts, 141 
however, the vision of Warren and Brandeis began to establish a 
permanent foothold. 
C. Clarification from Dean Prosser 
While the Warren-Brandeis article made the case for 
establishing a right to privacy, Prosser's article illuminated the 
interests such a right protected and what conduct should be 
precluded to further defend such rights. 142 Prosser's study of the 
reported privacy decisions led him to conclude that the right to 
privacy was not one independent tort, but actually four different 
torts, each of which safeguarded a different privacy interest. 143 He 
categorized them as an "[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion 
or solitude," 144 "[p ]ublic disclosure of embarrassing private facts 
about the plaintiff," 145 "[p ]ublicity which places the plaintiff in a 
false light in the public eye,,,146 and "[a]ppropriation, for the 
defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.,,147 
Prosser's work led to the categorization of privacy torts in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts,148 which has been exceedingly 
139. [d. at 69-70. 
140. See Gonn1ey, supra note 76, at 1353-54. 
141. "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in 
not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is 
liable to the other." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (\939). 
142. Prosser, supra note 103, at 389. 
143. [d. 
144. [d. 
145. [d. 
146. [d. 
147. [d. 
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
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influential in helping states determine whether, and to what extent, 
privacy rights should be recognized. 
1. Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
Prosser described this class of privacy cases as those which 
protected a plaintiffs mental interests when causes of action like 
trespass and nuisance did not do so sufficiently. 149 While the early 
cases focused on physical intrusions into a plaintiffs space,150 the 
cases began to eventually encompass any type of prying or 
intrusion into anything the plaintiff would consider private. 151 
Prosser was careful to note that intrusion cases, like the other 
privacy torts, were subject to limitations. 152 For example, Prosser 
felt plaintiffs could not expect to recover for any perceived slight 
or interference with their solitude. 153 Plaintiffs also could not state 
a claim for alleged intrusions that took place in public, where the 
plaintiff had no right to be left alone, or if there were disclosures 
that were required to comply with existing law. 154 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts followed Prosser's lead, 
defining the tort as follows: "One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another 
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other 
for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person." 155 The Restatement further 
stated that the intrusion could be harmful to the plaintiff s person, 
"his private affairs or concerns," 156 and could be accomplished "by 
the use of [a] defendant's senses, with or without mechanical 
aids." 157 Today, intrusion is probably the branch that best 
represents the goal of privacy torts-the protection against 
"affront[ s] to individual dignity." 158 
2. False Light 
Just as intruding upon one's seclusion was a possible invasion 
of privacy, it was similarly clear that when a party placed the 
149. Prosser, supra note 103, at 392. 
150. See, e.g., Byfield v. Candler, 125 S.E. 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924) (allowing a cause 
of action because defendant ventured into woman's stateroom on a steamship). 
151. Prosser, supra note 103, at 390-91. 
152. ld. 
153. ld. at 390 ("It is clear, however, that there must be something in the nature of 
prying or intrusion, and mere noises which disturb a church congregation or bad 
manners, harsh names and insulting gestures in public, have been held not to be 
enough."). 
154. ld. at 391. 
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
156. ld. at cmt. a. 
157. Jd. at cmt. b. 
158. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 489 (Cal. 1998). 
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plaintiff in a false light in the eye of the public, that too comprised 
a viable privacy claim.159 Prosser contended that American courts 
recognized three different contexts of successful false light actions: 
(1) When the defendant falsely attributed an opinion or statement 
to the plaintiff; 160 (2) when the defendant used the plaintiffs 
likeness or picture to highli~ht books or articles that were not 
connected to the plaintiff; I I or (3) the defendant used the 
plaintiffs image, name or physical characteristics among images 
including convicted criminals when the plaintiff was innocent of 
any crime. 162 Prosser also underlined that false light claims could 
also lead to defamation claims in some, but not all instances, 163 
and that like intrusion cases, supersensitive parties did not merit 
false light protection. 164 
The Restatement presently defines false light claims thusly: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning 
another that places the other before the public in a 
false light is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in 
which the other [person] was placed would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the 
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter 
and the false light· in which the other would be 
placed. 165 
In order for plaintiffs to be successful, they must prove the matter 
published is not true. 166 
Of the four privacy torts, courts have viewed the "false light" 
branch with the most cynicism. 167 Currently, only two-thirds of 
the states affirmatively recognize false light as a theory of 
recovery. 168 A number of states expressl~ reject it, includin~ 
Colorado,169 Massachusetts,170 Minnesota, I 1 North Carolina, 17 
Ohio,173 South Carolina, 174 Texas,175 and Virginia. 176 
159. Prosser, supra note 103, at 398. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 399. 
162. !d. 
163. ld. at 400. 
164. !d. 
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). 
166. ld. at cmt. a. 
167. See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text. 
168. Patricia Avidan, Comment, Protecting the Media's First Amendment Rights in 
Florida: Making False Light Plaintiffi Play by Defamation Rules, 35 STETSON L. 
REv. 227, 236 (2005). 
169. Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 894 (Colo. 2002). 
170. Elm Med. Lab., Inc. v. RKO Gen. Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675,681 (Mass. 1989), 
abrogated on other grounds by United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Ge1tman, 551 
N.E.2d 20,23 (Mass. 1990). 
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3. Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
Although Warren and Brandeis advocated for a general right to 
privacy, they appeared to be most disturbed at the increasing 
proclivity of the press to make public information which most 
would consider private. 177 Prosser characterized this type of 
invasion as public disclosure of private facts.178 He explained that 
the prior cases were consistent in that liability could only be 
imposed if the facts at issue could be categorized as private and if 
the disclosure was made publicly. 179 These limitations eliminated 
idle gossip between individuals as actionable, as well as anything 
that the plaintiff held out to the public for consumption. 180 
The Restatement (Second) again followed Prosser's lead, calling 
publicity claims permissible if the matter publicized is of the type 
that: "a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and b) 
is not of legitimate concern to the public.,,181 The disclosure cases 
are designed to protect the community standing of the plaintiff and 
can be construed as "an extension of defamation.,,182 Unlike 
defamation, however, the truth of the facts disclosed is not a 
defense to disclosure claims because a statement's falsity is not 
necessary to state a claim. 183 Disclosure cases are vulnerable to 
constitutional limitations, specifically those related to freedom of 
the press and freedom of speech. 184 
171. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998). 
172. Renwick v. News & ObserverPubl'g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 410 (N.c. 1984). 
173. Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666, 669-70 (Ohio 1983). 
174. Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 5 (S.c. 1989) (recognizing 
only three right to privacy torts: "(I) wrongful appropriation of personality; (2) 
wrongful publicizing of private affairs; and (3) wrongful intrusion into private 
affairs"). 
175. Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1994). 
176. WLJA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 395 n.5 (Va. 2002) (Virginia General 
Assembly "implicitly excluded" false light claims by choosing not to codify 
them). 
177. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 196. 
178. Prosser, supra note 103, at 392. 
179. Id. at 393-94. 
180. /d. Prosser, however, acknowledged the tension in the cases regarding nuance, 
such as whether the fact at issue was already a matter of public record when 
published by the defendant. See also Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 
(1975) (holding that no tort recovery is permissible for disclosure Of and publicity 
given to facts that are a matter of public record). 
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
182. Prosser, supra note 103, at 398. 
183. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 833, 841 (S.D. Tex. 2000). 
184. See generally Prosser, supra note 103, at 394-95. If the disclosed facts at issue 
are deemed newsworthy, the rights of a plaintiff who has unwittingly become a 
subject of publicity can be superseded by the public's legitimate interest in that 
person. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940). The First 
Amendment rights of the defendant can influence the determination of whether 
the disclosure was "offensive." See, e.g., id. (holding that the plaintiff, a 
reclusive former child prodigy, could not state a privacy claim against the 
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4. Appropriation 
The final category of privacy cases concerned the "exploitation 
of the plaintiffs identity," i.e., using the likeness or name of the 
plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant, without the plaintiffs 
consent. 185 The Restatement (Second) mirrored Prosser's language 
in defining appropriation, calling it viable when one "appropriates 
to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another.,,186 
Defendants have also been able to contest appropriation claims by 
successfully arguing that the use of one's likeness is permissible 
when made in the context of, or in reasonable relation to, a 
publication that is both newsworthy and of legitimate public 
concern. 187 
Although Prosser concluded that appropriation cases also fell 
under the rubric of privacy, the interest shielded by appropriation 
does not on its face seem to be aimed at protecting the plaintiffs 
mental tranquility in the same fashion as the other branches of this 
tort. 188 Prosser acknowledged that it instead appeared to protect 
the plaintiff s right to control the exploitation of his image in the 
same way one protects a copyright or trademark, ~iving 
appropriation claims both personal and economic texture. 18 For 
this reason, this branch is often overlapped with the right to a 
publicity cause of action, which celebrities periodically pursue 
when someone else uses their name without their consent for 
commercial purposes. 190 Still, because of the possible mental 
distress that can emanate from having one's image or likeness 
exposed to the public without consent, appropriation has survived 
as a practical extension of one's right to be left alone. 191 
magazine that revealed he was living in a rooming house because the facts were 
"newsworthy"). 
185. Prosser, supra note 103, at 401-02. The Pavesich case, which first recognized a 
right to privacy, could in theory have also been characterized as an appropriation 
case because of the insurance company's attempt at using the alleged testimonial 
from Mr. Pavesich to generate more business. See generally Pavesich v. New 
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
187. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977) 
(holding that an entertainer's claim against defendant for filming his circus-like 
act and broadcasting it on the evening news was not viable because of 
defendant's right to broadcast matters of public concern). 
188. See Prosser, supra note 103, at 406. 
189. Id. 
190. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835-36 
(6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a former entertainer's commercial identity was 
potentially appropriated by defendant's use of phrase "Here's Johnny" in 
association with defendant's product). 
191. While it has survived, appropriation has not done so unscathed. One court has 
called it "misleading" to attach the privacy label to appropriation claims because 
the interest protected is not really private in the same sense as the tort's other 
claims. Joe Dickerson & Assoc., L.L.c. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 999-1000 
(Colo. 200 I). For similar reasons, other courts have affirmatively distinguished 
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Prosser's four-fold categorization of what comprised the single 
tort of invasion of privacy covered the areas of physical, 
informational, and proprietary privacy, described by Professor 
Allen-Castellitto and others. 19 Although Prosser's article 
acknowledged that more than one theory could be used under the 
same set of facts, the article also concluded that it was not sound to 
lump all four theories together without distinguishing them. 193 
Prosser explained that while intrusion upon one's seclusion and 
public disclosure of private facts both necessitated the invasion of 
something confidential, this was not the case with the false light or 
appropriation tortS. 194 Appropriation required something the 
defendant could use to his or her own advantage, making it distinct 
from the other three forms,195 and false light claims needed proof 
of falsity or fiction in a way the other forms did not. 196 Each 
covers a distinct mode of invasion and addresses slightly different 
affronts to one's personal dignity. 197 
Prosser also concluded that the right to privacy is generally a 
personal one that does not extend to others unless their privacy is 
invaded along with the plaintiff. 198 It is also generally not 
actionable after the plaintiffs death unless expressly provided for 
by statute. 199 Today, most courts limit the right to privacy to 
individuals and do not grant corporations a similar right. 200 Only 
two states do not currently recognize some form of the privacy 
rights first espoused by Warren and Brandeis and later crystallized 
by Prosser: North Dakota and Wyoming. 201 
PART III 
The functionality of the Internet relies on the acquisition and 
accumulation of copious amounts of data. Because more and more 
corporations like financial banking institutions and health care 
between cases involving the bruised egos of plaintiffs (appropriation) and suits 
seeking damages for usurping the commercial value associated with the 
plaintiffs' identity. See, e.g., PETA v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269, 1283-84 (Nev. 
1995) (stating that appropriation claims involve only the "personal, injured-
feelings quality" connected to the use of the plaintiffs image or likeness). 
192. Allen-Castellitto, supra note 84, at 13; Joann M. Wakana, Comment, The Future 
of Online Privacy: A Proposal for International Legislation, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L 
& COMPo L. REV. 151, 157 (2003). 
193. Prosser, supra note 103, at 407. 
194. /d. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 260. 
198. Prosser, supra note 103, at 408. 
199. Id. 
200. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). 
201. DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS, § I-I (2002); see Hougum v. Valley Mem'l 
Homes, 1998 ND 24,574 N.W.2d 812, 816 (1998). 
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organizations are keeping client records online,202 sensItive 
information is more vulnerable to those with the ability, 
technology, and desire to access such records without 
permission. 203 This naturally creates new concerns about whether 
the privacy of individuals is adequate7 protected against these 
somewhat non-traditional intrusions. 20 Advertising-supported 
software has already forced courts to assess the boundaries of 
existing copyright and trademark laws. 205 It seems only a matter 
of time before an individual, who may not have initially 
understood the potential infringement of spyware programs brings 
. 206 
smt, too. 
A. Making the Case for the Plaintiff 
On occasion, plaintiffs have been able to argue that several of 
the four privacy theories-intrusion, appropriation, false liffiht, and 
disclosure-were simultaneously pertinent to their claims.2 7 This 
would not be as likely to occur in suits related to spyware. For 
example, a disclosure theory requires the public disclosure of facts 
that would generally be considered private. 208 The applicability of 
disclosure to spyware-related claims would hinge on how broadly 
the court would interpret the term "public.,,209 Spyware providers 
typically only offer the mechanism by which data can be 
accessed. 21o There is usually no "publication" of the information 
received about the user; it is collected by a third party for future 
use. Still, if the collection of this information reached a significant 
number of parties, a court could find that sufficient to satisfy the 
202. Gillian Flynn, Privacy in an Age of Online Record-Keeping, WORKFORCE MGMT., 
Aug. 200 I, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOFXS/is_8_80/ai_77612539. 
203. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text. 
204. See GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, THE LAW OF THE INTERNET § 
1.07 (2d ed. 2006). 
205. See, e.g., 1-800 CONTACTS, Inc. v. WHENU.COM, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting plaintiff injunction to prevent defendant from 
delivering pop-up ads to users). But see Wells Fargo & Co. v. WHENU.COM, 
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (denying plaintiff's motion to enjoin 
defendant from providing pop-up ads on plaintiff's Internet Web site). 
206. Through August 2006, there were no reported cases where a plaintiff has alleged 
a cornmon law invasion of privacy action due to spyware-related concerns. 
207. See, e.g., Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998) (fmding 
that intrusion, appropriation, and disclosure theories potentially applied to a case 
where defendant's employee circulated photos of plaintiffs naked); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. d (1977). 
208. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489, 495 (1975). 
209. Taiwo A. Oriola, Regulating Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail in the 
United States and the European Union: Challenges and Prospects, 7 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 113, 161 (2005) (quoting Perry v. United Kingdom, 39 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 76, 85 (2004». 
210. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
2006] Virtual Espionage 25 
requirement that the fact be released to the public at large.2l1 If, 
however, the plaintiffs claim focused on the privacy infringement 
created by the presence of spyware, neither the theory of public 
disclosure of private facts nor the theory of painting one in a false 
light would be actionable because of the lack ofpublication.212 
Appropriation claims, although a slightly better match than 
disclosure and false light, are still an inexact fit. 213 Plaintiffs could 
argue that information collected by spyware about their perceived 
personal preferences is done for the commercial benefit of targeted 
advertising, generating potential profit for the defendant, either by 
using the information directly or selling it to another party.214 The 
Restatement, however, clearly says the purpose of appropriation 
claims is to shield an individual's interest in the exclusive use of 
his own identity.215 Accordingly, appropriation suits 
characteristically require manipulation of the plaintiffs name or 
likeness, such as publishing a person's photograph without consent 
in an advertisement, as was the case in Pavesich,216 or 
impersonating an individual to obtain information about another 
party.217 Spyware programs only gather data to forecast user 
behavior and Web tendencies. 218 
This leaves intrusion as the most viable avenue for spyware 
claims. Intrusion cases typically require that plaintiffs clear two 
hurdles to state a claim, both of which are consistent with the 
211. See generally infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
212. See generally supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text. If the plaintiff's 
lawsuit focused on the party who provided information to a third party without 
the plaintiff's knowledge, the theories of disc.losure and false light could be more 
applicable. Plaintiffs would still have to show the information accessed and 
distributed was private, which at least one court found to be problematic. See, 
e.g., Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that 
no privacy claim existed against defendant who transferred information of cell-
phone customers to research firm because information obtained was not private). 
213. See supra notes 189-192 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 216-223 
and accompanying text. 
214. See, e.g., Dwyerv. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977). 
216. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b. 
218. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In Dwyer, the plaintiffs, as part of a 
class action, sought to recover on an appropriation theory because of the 
defendant's practice of renting cardholder information about their spending habits 
to other merchants. 652 N.E.2d at 1356. The defendant, American Express, 
successfully argued that the practice did not adversely affect the interest of 
cardholders under the language of the Restatement. [d. The court found that 
while each cardholder's name did possess value for the defendants, an individual 
name had value only "when it is associated with one of defendants' lists. 
Defendants create value by categorizing and aggregating these names. 
Furthermore, defendants' practices do not deprive any of the cardholders of any 
value their individual names may possess." Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs' 
appropriation claim. Id. 
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Restatement approach. 219 First, there must be an intentional 
intrusion into what would normally be considered an area of 
seclusion or privacy.220 Second, although intrusion claims seek to 
protect an individual's subjective right to be left alone, courts have 
used an objective standard to assess liability.22I Therefore, the 
intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 222 
Predictably, there has been considerable discussion over these 
fairly rudimentary requirements. 223 
Plaintiffs must first have a reasonable exgectation of privacy in 
the area allegedly violated by the defendant. 24 While absolute and 
complete privacy is not necessary,225 there must usually be a 
showing that the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or 
sensory privacy surrounding the plaintiff. 226 This can entail a wide 
variety of activity, encompassing physical intrusions on to one's 
property,227 Esychological intrusions created by reading or copying 
one's mail,2 8 wiretaps,229 and persistent late-night phone calls.230 
Without a reasonable expectation of privacy, the alleged intrusion 
does not impact one's seclusion, which is why courts have 
repeatedly rebuffed plaintiffs who attempt to seek recovery for 
intrusion while in fairly public venues. 231 Moreover, the plaintiffs 
219. See supra notes 215-217 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 220-221 
and accompanying text. 
220. See, e.g., Bailer v. Frye Ins. Exch., 344 Md. 515, 524-26, 687 A.2d 1375, 1380 
(1997); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 8A, 652B (1977). 
221. See Mo. Court of Appeals v. The Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488,504 
(Mo. 1990). 
222. See, e.g., Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
223. See infra notes 224-237. 
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6520 (1977). 
225. See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 69 (Cal. 1999) (holding that 
where elements of intrusion are proven, the cause of action is not defeated as a 
matter of law simply because the events intruded upon were not completely and 
totally private). 
226. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 489-90 (Cal. 1998). The 
Shulman court extended privacy rights much further than many courts have, 
finding that individuals do not lose all privacy rights merely by being at work. 
Jd. at 490-91. This allowed an employee to state a privacy claim against a 
defendant who had utilized a helmet camera and audio tape recorder to tape 
conversations involving the plaintiff in his workplace without the plaintiff's 
consent. Jd. at 474-77. 
227. See, e.g., Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.c. Ct. App. 1996) (precluding 
defendant's summary judgment motion on plaintiff's intrusion claim when 
defendants placed video camera in plaintiff's bedroom and diverted his mail so 
they could examine it). 
228. Id. at 355. 
229. Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 66 Md. App. 133, 165, 502 A.2d 1101, 
1117 (1986). 
230. Zeilinger v. Amalgamated Clothing, 683 So. 2d 726, 733 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
231. See, e.g., Muratore v. MIS Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471 (D. Me. 1987), rev'd 
on other grounds, 845 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that passenger on cruise 
ship could not state privacy claim when ship's employees took photographs of 
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privacy expectations must be measured in such a way so they do 
not encroach upon the possible rights of the defendant. 232 
Second, the intrusion must be one that is objectively 
unreasonable and offensive. 233 While ultimately this is a question 
of fact, courts customarily intervene in these types of claims to 
determine if the alleged offensive act sufficiently states a claim. 234 
No consistent litmus test exists nationwide, and courts have 
differed upon how the intrusion has to offend sensibilities. 235 
Courts do, however, regularly consider "the degree of intrusion, 
the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion 
as well as the intruder's motives, and objectives, the setting into 
which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is 
invaded.,,236 The social expectations of a society also influence an 
assessment of the defendant's behavior. 237 
Despite the dearth of litigation over spyware, the software does 
contain central characteristics that courts have seen many times 
over: (1) Despite its rapidly evolving development, spyware is 
really just another form of electronic surveillance; 238 and (2) it is 
designed to collect information for the benefit of third-parties. 239 
Both of these traits have been the subject of privacy litigation in 
the past, and can therefore offer some clues as to how privacy suits 
related to spyware may be received. 24o 
her without her consent because she was in public and not in a physical realm of 
her own). 
232. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986,995 (2d Cir. 1973). 
233. See infra notes 234-237 and accompanying text. 
234. See, e.g., Carter v. Innisfree Hotel, Inc., 661 So. 2d 1174, 1178 (Ala. 1995). 
235. In Carter, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs properly stated a 
claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Id. at 1178. The plaintiffs, a married couple, 
stayed on the defendant's premises, unaware that a peephole had been drilled 
behind a mirror in their room. Id. at 1177. The plaintiffs were in various states 
of undress before discovering the peephole. Id. The court allowed them to state 
a claim even though they could not prove that anyone had actually observed them 
in the room. Id. at 1178-79. The court instead focused on the method of 
potential intrusion and allowed them to state a claim. Id. Conversely, in Galella, 
the former wife of President John F. Kennedy counter-claimed under an intrusion 
theory against a photographer who was suing her for interference with trade, and 
was granted an injunction against the photographer. 487 F.2d at 998. The 
appellate court held that the injunction was too broad, and as long as the 
photographer did not act in an inconspicuous manner, he had the right to take 
pictures of Ms. Onassis. Id. 
236. PETA v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269, 1282 (Nev. 1995). 
237. Id. at 1281. 
238. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that 
a spyware program was included under legislation that ensured privacy for 
electronic communications). 
239. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
240. For example, in Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996), the 
plaintiff-husband and defendant-wife separated after five years of marriage. The 
defendant made arrangements to have a surveillance camera placed in the 
plaintiffs home. !d. at 352. Although the plaintiff discovered the camera and 
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Plaintiffs can first point to the Restatement, which many states 
follow very closely,24 for common sense support for an intrusion 
claim. Section 652B, in discussing intrusion upon seclusion, says 
that one's seclusion can be invaded "by the use of the defendant's 
senses, with or without"mechanical aids, [or] by some other form 
of investigation or examination into his private concems.,,242 
Moreover, it is the intrusion itself that makes the defendant subject 
to liability, making publication or any other use of the information 
irrelevant. 243 Spyware can be classified as a mechanical aid used 
for the purpose of monitoring one's Web habits. Defendants could 
argue that there are no "senses" used with spyware, but because the 
overall goal is to watch the user's habits, spyware appears to fall 
within the parameters of this Restatement language. 
For example, in 0 'Brien v. 0 'Brien, 244. the plaintiff-husband, 
embroiled in a difficult break-up with the defendant, his wife, 
moved to enjoin her from using communications she obtained from 
his personal computer as evidence in their divorce proceedings. 245 
When the couple began having marital problems, his wife installed 
a spyware program on his computer without his knowledge. 246 
The husband had engaged in private online conversations with 
another woman, and the spyware program captured and recorded 
all of the conversations, instant messages, and e-mails sent and 
received by the user.247 The husband did not sue under an invasion 
of privacy theory, but he was able to successfully enjoin his wife 
from disclosing the intercepted data in their divorce proceeding, a 
decision that was affirmed by the Florida District Court of 
Appeal. 248 The plaintiff alleged that the e-mails and instant 
messages were illegally obtained in violation of the Florida 
Security of Communications Act, making them inadmissible in the 
divorce. 249 Although the court focused much of its discussion on 
matters of statutory interpretation, it did find the purpose of the 
dismantled it, he used the invasion as the foundation of an invasion of privacy 
claim. /d. at 352-55. The court found that the: 
Plaintiffs forecast of the evidence shows that defendants invaded his 
home, indeed, his bedroom, and placed a hidden video camera in his 
room which recorded pictures of him undressing, showering, and 
going to bed. . .. A jury could conclude that these invasions would 
be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
Id. at 354. 
241. See. e.g., Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221,1223 (Me. 1977). 
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cm!. b (1977). 
243. Id. 
244. 899 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 2005). 
245. /d. at 1134. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 1137. 
249. /d. at 1134. 
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Florida Act to be the protection of every person's right to be free 
from intrusion into their private conversations and 
communications.25o Because the court agreed that the spyware-
generated information was illegally obtained in violation of the 
Act, 0 'Brien can be fairly read to infer that information exchanged 
on the Internet is just as private as more traditional communication 
mediums. 
o 'Brien provides evidence that plaintiffs should be able to 
favorably compare spyware with other surveillance tools that have 
been deemed to violate a r:laintiffs privacy rights. In Black v. City 
& County of Honolulu, 51 the United States District Court of 
Hawaii overturned a summary judgment motion and held that the 
plaintiff likely stated an intrusion claim when the defendant placed 
a wiretap on the plaintiffs personal pa~er in potential retaliation 
for her filing a sexual harassment claim. 52 In Tompkins v. Cyr,253 
a doctor stated an intrusion claim against anti-abortion activists by 
showing that the defendants regularly sat on a street near the 
doctor's home and watched him by using binoculars and a 
camera. 254 In both cases, the defendants were unable to argue that 
because there was not a physical intrusion or trespass on to the 
plaintiffs property, there could be no privacy claim.255 Similarly, 
spyware providers, while not physically entering the plaintiffs 
domain, still may use devices that create the tortious activity. 256 
The methodologies may differ, but the objective is still the same-
the surveillance of the plaintiff s movements. 257 
Despite the seemingly direct tie between an invasion of privacy 
and the primary goal of spyware, plaintiffs are still only likely to 
find viable claims in very specific contexts. First, plaintiffs would 
probably need to be in their home using their own personal 
computers for the best chance of recovery.258 As Warren and 
Brandeis suggested 115 years ago, "[t]he common law has always 
recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to 
its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands.,,259 
Courts would likely be more receptive to the theory that a plaintiff, 
while in his home, using a server connection he or she believed to 
250. [d. at 1135. 
251. 112 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (D. Haw. 2000). 
252. [d. at 1053-54. 
253. 995 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1998). 
254. [d. at 684. 
255. Black, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1052-54; Tompkins, 995 F. Supp. at 684. 
256. See, e.g., Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, L.L.C., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1229 (N.D. Ill. 
2005). 
257. See The Forsite Group, Neutralizing the Spyware Threat (2005), 
http://www.8e6.comlnewsletter/8e6/docs/wtp_r3000_neutralizing-spyware.htm. 
258. See infra notes 263-265 and accompanying text. 
259. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 220. 
30 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 36 
be secure, out of the view of others, had a legitimate and 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 260 Plaintiffs who lose access to 
personal information due to spyware while on the job are likely to 
have more difficulty because courts have generally held that there 
is a reduced expectation of privacy in the workplace. 261 
Second, plaintiffs would likely need to show they were 
negatively impacted by a more aggressive spyware application like 
the keystroke logger to be able to state a meritorious claim. 262 
Because all intrusions are not actionable, an application that 
merely monitors user activity is not as likely to be deemed "highly 
offensive" by a court. 263 But applications like keystroke loggers 
are easier to categorize as such because of the surreptitious manner 
and conduct associated with their installation, and the generally 
disreputable motives and purposes of those who install them. 264 
If possible, plaintiffs should also attempt to identify both the 
installer/provider of the spyware program and the party that 
harvested the data, and then sue both parties simultaneously.265 
This is problematic for practical reasons because like Danielle, 
users often have no idea who has accessed their computer data.266 
Moreover, many spyware providers can operate from overseas 
locations without difficulty, well beyond the purview of U.S. 
law. 267 But ideally, a plaintiff would want to sue both installer and 
provider for damage purposes. 268 Plaintiffs are typically entitled to 
receive general damages from harm that stems from the wrongful 
act and special damages from all harm that proximately results,269 
but the dignitary harm that stems from spyware intrusions is harder 
260. See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004); Vo v. City 
of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
261. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1987). 
262. See infra notes 263-264 and accompanying text. 
263. Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles 
Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289, 302-
03 (2002). 
264. See Spyware: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 108th Congo (2004) (statement of Rep. Clifford Stearns, 
Chairman, House S. Comm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection), 
available at 
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to quantify. 270 It is therefore unclear as to the extent of damages 
one could receive from the mere application of spyware programs 
because it is the third-party's use of infonnation harvested by the 
spyware-credit card numbers, bank account infonnation, and 
Social Security numbers-that results in the most serious harm.271 
Since some courts have held that such infonnation is not private if 
it can be obtained from public sources,272 the mere placement of 
spyware may only result in nominal damages at best if all the 
spyware program did was provide infonnation to a third party. 273 
Without those fundamental components present in a lawsuit, 
bringing individual privacy claims may, not be financially viable 
for the party who is victimized by spyware because the expense of 
litigation is likely to outweigh the recovery.274 Class action 
lawsuits could possibly yield more success against these software 
providers, but they too are far from a guarantee. 275 
B. Making the Case for the Defendant 
Defendants have proven to be very resilient in intrusion cases, 
and have received favorable results across the country in a variety 
of contexts where privacy violations have been alleged. 276 
Defendants can first contend that the Internet and World Wide 
Web are both, in essence, public locales, albeit in a divergent form. 
Users can engage in conversations online, play poker, and shop in 
much the same way they can in any other public venue. Because 
so many other people are online simultaneously, there is likely to 
be support for the defendant's contention that plaintiffs cannot 
realistically call the Web a place of isolation or seclusion, 
regardless of where they are physically when they connect to the 
Internet. 277 
270. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
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REV. 329, 348-50 (2005). 
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Additionally, a great deal of spyware is delivered when users 
seek the benefits of "free" software applications that can be 
downloaded without financial cost. 278 The licensing agreements 
that accompany this software regularly contain language that 
allows the software provider to install other applications on an 
individual's computer.279 By clicking "I acceft" or "OK," users 
consent to all the terms of the agreement. 28 Plaintiffs would 
therefore not be able to successfully contend that they had no 
notice of the additional programs, despite the linguistic obfuscation 
that frequently characterizes these licensing agreements. 281 With 
such consent, defendants can argue the subsequent activity on 
one's computer is no longer secluded because by assenting to the 
other programs, the user has agreed to be observed, negating a 
central element of intrusion. 282 Plaintiffs could conceivably argue 
that the consent was invalid because they were unaware of what 
they were agreeing to do, but that is unlikely to be convincing in 
most cases. 283 
Courts have also rejected intrusion claims where defendants 
took previously collected information and subsequently sold it or 
shared it with a third party. 284 In Dwyer v. American Express 
CO.,285 the plaintiffs, as part of a class action, sued the defendants 
for invasion of privacy under both intrusion and appropriation 
theories. 286 The defendants had a business practice of renting out 
lists containing its customer names and other information to other 
merchants and giving the merchants data about the spending habits 
of particular cardholders. 287 Since this was done without the 
consent of the plaintiffs, they alleged this constituted an intrusion 
upon their seclusion. 288 The court held that because cardholders 
provided the information voluntarily, the plaintiffs could not 
successfully argue that the intrusion was unauthorized. 
"Defendants rent names and addresses after they create a list of 
cardholders who have certain shopping tendencies; they are not 
278. See, e.g., Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, L.L.c., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223-24 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005). 
279. See id. 
280. See id. 
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with regard to accepting these terms likely trumps any argument that parties did 
not know to what they were consenting. 
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disclosing financial infonnation about particular cardholders. 
These lists are being used solely for the purpose of detennining 
what type of advertising should be sent to whom.,,289 
The majority of spyware tools are most regularly used to 
detennine what type of advertisements should be sent to users. 290 
Since spyware programs generally only collect data and pass it to 
other parties,291 defendants could argue that any invasion of 
privacy claim should fail under the logic followed in Dwyer. 292 
Even if plaintiffs should clear these obstacles, the level of 
intrusiveness must still reach the "highly offensive" threshold. 293 
Dozens of courts have rejected plaintiffs at the summary jud,rment 
stage, finding that the conduct was not "highly offensive.,,29 The 
combination of any or all of these arguments provides defendants 
with fonnidable ammunition in defending such claims. 
In summary, one of the major obstacles to any technology-
based lawsuit is the lack of complete understanding as to how the 
Internet operates and how its applications are changing the way 
people live, communicate, and relate to one another. 295 This 
deficiency of appreciation is likely to produce cynicism in some 
legal circles with regard to these types of lawsuits. Still, the author 
supports the position that acknowledging such claims requires 
neither overhaul nor renovation of existing tort principles. 296 With 
better insight into how Internet-driven applications like spyware 
can affect individual rights, it is likely that courts would more 
rapidly find invasions upon individual solitude in ways that are not 
in keeping with traditional paths to liability for privacy violations. 
289. [d. at 1355. 
290. See supra Part I(A)-(8). 
291. See Poe, supra note 271, at 330, 346. 
292. See supra notes 285-289 and accompanying text; see also Remsburg v. 
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can effectively apply existing legal rights, obligations, and remedies 
to the network in a manner consistent with the public interest yet 
conductive [sic] to the Internet's ability to realize its positive 
commercial, social, and political potential. 
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CONCLUSION 
When Ian Fleming's legendary book series detailing the 
adventures of British super-agent James Bond started being made 
into movies in the 1960s, nearly every film devoted at least one 
scene to the "toys" Bond might need to combat his enemies. 297 
His briefcase alone came equipped with tear gas, a sniper's rifle, 
and a flat-bladed throwing knife. 298 Four small leather cases could 
be instantly turned into a one-man helicopter, complete with 
machine guns and rocket launchers. 299 Bond's watches might 
contain poison darts or plastic explosives. 30o All of these items 
were typically needed to save the world on-screen, but at the time, 
it is doubtful even the inventive screenwriters of those 007 films 
could have foreseen today's arsenal of electronic gadgets, an 
assortment varied enough to make de facto "James Bonds" out of 
otherwise ordinary people. The question still remains, however, as 
to whether society's increasing dependence upon technology 
demands a decreased expectation of individual privacy. 
To date, courts have adhered to the current four branches of 
privacy torts quite faithfully. 301 This, however, has produced some 
results that at minimum, seem in considerable tension with the 
stated goals of this area of the law. In Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 302 
for example, the plaintiffs represented a class of cellular phone 
users who filed suit against several defendants for acts associated 
with epidemiological studies investigating the connection between 
mortality and cellular phone use. 303 Defendants Wireless 
Technology Research, LLC and Cellular Telecommunications & 
Internet Association funded two of the studies, which were 
completed by Epidemiology Resources, Inc. (ERI).304 To create a 
database, two other defendants, Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems 
and Comcast Cellular Communications, provided ERI with 
customers' names, street addresses, cities, states, Social Security 
numbers, and cellular phone account numbers, among other 
things. 305 ERI then mailed the customers a survey about their 
297. See, e.g., FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE (United Artists 1963); OCTOPUSSY (United 
Artists 1983). 
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cellular phone usage and published the results. 306 The customers 
had not given any permission to forward the information to ERl 
and filed suit, using a number of theories. 307 
The court rejected the plaintiffs' privacy claim for intrusion, 
finding that Social Security numbers, names, and telephone 
numbers were not "private" information standing alone. 308 The 
court found that because such information could be found in public 
records, and the data was neither compromising nor embarrassin~, 
the defendants did not violate the privacy rights of the plaintiffs. 3 9 
Such a finding undercuts the basic privac~ rights that Brandeis and 
Warren advocated for so skillfully. 10 Merely providing 
information for others to access in a context where it must be given 
in order to receive use of the product or benefit of a service does 
not necessarily mean the information should no longer be thought 
of as confidential at all. Because of the rise in identity theft, most 
people would consider data like Social Security numbers to be 
private information, and would likely not approve of the 
unauthorized sharing of such data. Busse offers a classic example 
of not being able to find the ocean because of all the water, and is 
illustrative of how some courts have bypassed what should be the 
fundamental matter of all privacy cases-whether the release of 
the information without the consent of the plaintiffs infringed on 
their individual independence. 311 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has described the right to 
privacy as "an integral part of our humanity; one has a public 
persona, exposed and active, and a private persona, guarded and 
preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our 
lives shall become public and which parts we shall hold close.,,312 
Courts have already recognized privacy intrusions caused by 
wiretaps, binoculars, and video cameras. 313 It therefore follows 
that allowing claims based on spyware intrusions protects the vital 
interests expressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 314 
Recognizing such claims may require courts to expand the 
parameters of what privacy may mean in a society with such 
rapidly evolving technological capability. But it is clear that future 
tools will be devised to gather information about us for myriad 
purposes, ranging from selling cookware to consumers to 
306. [d. 
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308. [d. at 1017. 
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protecting our national security. These scientific gains, combined 
with our post-September 11, 2001 interest in data collection, 
represent considerable challenges to safe¥:uarding the principles 
stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 3 5 Still, given that the 
chief question in privacy claims tends to be whether the plaintiff 
suffered a loss of his or her right to be left alone because of a third-
party's activity, it makes sense that courts recognize claims against 
providers of spyware. Such lawsuits would certainly face 
definitive challenges, but could be illustrative of the need to see 
existing law through a different prism because we live in a 
different era. 
Until then, spyware will likely continue to evolve and mutate, 
as programmers on both sides of the fence take turns playing 
leapfrog. Web browsers will keep developing software 
applications that block spyware, while spyware programmers will 
devise new methods of installation to keep their programs from 
being impeded. At least for now, consumers like Danielle are 
probably best served by taking precautions to ensure their own 
privacy, such as installing anti-spyware programs on their personal 
computers, treating free software programs with healthy 
skepticism, and avoiding all unsolicited advertisements and e-mail 
attachments. Although it may be a cliche, an ounce of prevention 
may indeed be worth a pound of cure. 
315. /d. 
